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Russia has launched a three-pronged campaign against Kyiv involving intensified airstrikes, sabotage and efforts to create political instability, according to two senior Ukrainian officials cited by The Economist. The officials said the campaign is expected to intensify before winter, with attempts to destabilize the capital potentially peaking by November.
The assessment comes after a sharp change in the pattern of Russian attacks on Kyiv. Over the past week, Russian drones have struck supermarkets, data centers and other civilian sites, while a hospital and the National Academy of Sciences in central Kyiv were also hit. Ukrainian authorities reported civilian casualties.
According to The Economist, Ukrainian intelligence had warned days before the latest wave that Russia was preparing a campaign combining bombardment, sabotage and efforts to generate political chaos.
One Ukrainian official told the magazine in mid-September that data centers and supermarkets were among the immediate targets. The sources said they expected the pressure on Kyiv to increase well before the winter months.
Russia prepares for another winter campaign
Alongside the attacks on civilian and digital infrastructure, Russia is continuing its established strategy of targeting critical utilities ahead of winter.
Ukrainian officials say Russian forces are targeting key components of electricity, water and sewage systems, with particular attention to pumping infrastructure.
Ballistic missiles remain one of Ukraine’s most difficult threats because of the limited number of systems capable of intercepting them. At the same time, Russia has dramatically increased its use of a newer generation of relatively inexpensive jet-powered drones.
These drones can move faster than earlier Shahed variants and, according to Ukrainian assessments cited by The Economist, can adjust their flight and search for targets in real time.
Ukraine is still developing interceptor systems capable of countering these drones in sufficient numbers.
A Ukrainian security official told the magazine that Russia had accumulated “thousands” of drones and was simultaneously increasing its stockpile of ballistic missiles, with plans to use much of that inventory during the next two months. These figures and assessments have not been independently verified.
The Institute for the Study of War has also reported a shift toward more frequent daytime and overnight Russian drone attacks, particularly against Kyiv, with strikes increasingly affecting shopping centers, food warehouses and other civilian facilities. ISW assessed that the tactic could disrupt daily life and economic activity as well as increase pressure on the population.
Ukrainian counterintelligence reports 7–8 disrupted operations a week
The second component of the alleged Russian campaign involves hybrid operations inside Ukraine.
Ukrainian counterintelligence officials say they are disrupting roughly seven or eight Russian operations every week. According to the officials cited by The Economist, many of these plots are organized remotely, with recruits inside Ukraine contacted through messaging platforms such as Telegram.
Some operations allegedly involve Russian operatives entering Ukraine directly. Ukrainian officials also claim that Russian services sometimes use relatives of recruited operatives who remain in Russia as leverage.
Ukrainian intelligence services dismantled large parts of Russia’s agent network after the full-scale invasion began, but officials believe that some dormant cells remain active or could potentially be reactivated.
The claims about specific covert operations are based on Ukrainian intelligence assessments and are not independently verifiable.
Moscow seeks to exploit war fatigue
The third component identified by The Economist is an information campaign aimed at increasing political tensions and exploiting fatigue caused by the prolonged war.
Ukraine has developed substantial defenses against Russian propaganda over the course of the conflict, but officials say the effects of years of war, economic pressure and repeated attacks could create a more difficult environment.
Corruption scandals, political disputes and criticism of government organization provide material that Russian influence networks can amplify online.
One Ukrainian official cited by the magazine expressed concern that worsening living conditions could increase tensions within Ukrainian society.
Other officials were less convinced that Russia could achieve such an outcome. Andrii Kovalenko, head of Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation, said Russia has repeatedly developed plans based on the expectation that information operations could provoke mass protests and demands for concessions.
Kyiv’s infrastructure has become more resilient
Despite the intensity of the attacks, analysts cited by The Economist argue that Russia faces limits in its ability to paralyze Kyiv.
The capital’s telecommunications infrastructure has become highly decentralized, meaning that individual strikes on data centers are unlikely to cut internet access across the city completely.
The same principle applies to the power system. Years of war have reduced Ukraine’s reserve capacity, but repair crews have also gained extensive experience in restoring damaged infrastructure quickly.
Energy-sector expert Olha Babii said the key issue is not whether infrastructure can be damaged, but how rapidly it can be restored.
Daily life in Kyiv has therefore continued despite the attacks. The Economist noted that restaurants, concerts and other public activities remain active even as residents respond to repeated air-raid warnings.
Residents prepare for a difficult winter
At the same time, there are signs that some Kyiv residents are preparing for the possibility of a more difficult winter.
Demand for houses outside Kyiv and in western Ukrainian regions has reportedly increased, with some families securing alternative accommodation in case living conditions in the capital deteriorate.
Ukrainian officials also estimate that Kyiv’s population, which increased during the early stages of the full-scale invasion as internally displaced people arrived, has since declined.
Some officials privately expect parts of the capital to become less populated if attacks on energy and other infrastructure intensify during the winter.
The Economist noted, however, that historical experience offers no guarantee that sustained bombardment will force a state to surrender. Ukraine has repeatedly adapted to Russian attacks and maintained core services despite severe infrastructure damage.
Battlefield pressure adds another dimension
The reported campaign against Kyiv is unfolding alongside developments on the front.
Ukrainian forces have reported tactical gains near Lyman in Donetsk region, including operations involving large numbers of drones. The Economist suggested that setbacks or limited progress on the battlefield could be one factor behind Moscow’s increased focus on attacks against Ukrainian cities.
The broader Russian strategy therefore appears to combine military pressure at the front with attacks designed to disrupt daily life, damage critical infrastructure and test Ukraine’s ability to withstand prolonged pressure.
Ukrainian officials warn that the coming months could be particularly difficult, while emphasizing that Kyiv’s infrastructure and defense systems have become more resilient through more than four years of full-scale war.